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ARTICLES
THE MORAL BASIS OF STATE CORPORATE
LAW DISCLOSURE
Eric A. Chiappinelli*
Since the 1930s, publicly held American corporations have been sub-
jected to an increasingly elaborate federal system of mandatory disclo-
sure. The merits of this system have garnered extensive scholarly com-
mentary.' While these federal requirements apply only to public
corporations, every corporation, public and private, is subject to the
disclosure requirements of its state of incorporation. The most influen-
tial state in this regard is, of course, Delaware, but the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA)2 has also been influential. Both the Delaware
act and the MBCA are far less extensive than the federal securities laws
in the amount of information they require corporations to disclose. In
contrast to the federal requirements, state-mandated corporate disclo-
sure laws have received no sustained scholarly attention. Most commen-
tators have analyzed state requirements only in connection with the
adoption of the federal securities laws.
When one focuses on the federal and state disclosure schemes, the
central puzzle is why federal disclosure is extensive while state disclosure
is minimal. The federal government surely has the power to preempt
state regulation but, as we will see, state-mandated corporate disclosure
was minimal even before the federal requirements were first adopted.
The difference in approach cannot, then, be explained by suggesting than
an elaborate state scheme atrophied when federal regulation preempted
it.
Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. My thanks to my research assistant,
Wendy Pursel Rocke. This Article grew out of my participation in a symposium on corpo-
rate disclosure and its impact on corporate morality and efficiency held at The Catholic
University of America, Columbus School of Law. I am grateful also to Professor David A.
Lipton for allowing me to speak at that Symposium.
1. See 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 172-213 (3d ed.
1998) (collecting much of the literature on the federal corporate disclosure system); see
also Symposium, Corporate Disclosure and Its Impact on Corporate Morality/Efficiency,
48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1998).
2. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (3d ed. & Supp. 1998/99).
Catholic University Law Review
The questions, "Why are the state and federal disclosure approaches
so different?", and "What is the origin of these differences?", can be an-
swered without resorting to normative evaluation. Such answers, how-
ever, would quickly be unsatisfying on their own. We need to analyze
the normative implications of the philosophical differences between state
and federal corporate disclosure requirements and ask whether these dif-
ferences effectuate good social policy. Even more interesting is that the
dominant explanation of the origin of these differences has a very strong
moral dimension.3 More specifically, the traditional analysis suggests
that the states have acted immorally by failing to impose greater disclo-
sure obligations on their corporations.
The standard interpretation of this puzzle of corporate disclosure be-
gan in the late 1920s, before the federal government enacted disclosure
regulations. In this standard interpretation, several prominent observers
argued that American corporations were too secretive about their inter-
nal affairs. These observers believed that the solution was for the gov-
ernment to require corporations to disclose more detailed financial and
operational information. The prominent observers believed that the
states were both incapable and morally unwilling to impose the increased
disclosure obligations. Accordingly, the experts argued for the federal
government to compel disclosure.
In the wake of the 1929 stock market crash, these suggestions became
the basis for the federal securities laws' disclosure requirements. Thus,
even though state disclosure obligations remained moribund, the federal
government imposed the appropriate solution on corporate America.
Other interpretations, based on financial and corporate theory rather
than on history, are consonant with the standard interpretation. That is,
they focus on the federal regulations and either ignore state disclosure or
consider the states rather reprobate.
The actual origin of the state disclosure requirements shows that the
states acted ethically. The states rooted their approach in the division of
power they imposed between shareholders and managers. The states
created a system of corporate disclosure that recognized the differences
in power between these two groups, especially the limited role of share-
holders. The states' choice does not reflect, therefore, a lack of ethics or
an inability to impose more elaborate standards. To the contrary, the
states were powerful, rational, and moral in their decisions.
3. Throughout this Article I use the words "moral" and "ethical" interchangeably,
although I realize that some commentators often regard the concepts as distinct from one
another.
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Today, calls for increased state corporate disclosure requirements are
posited on two moral bases. The stronger basis asserts that more strin-
gent requirements would result in the needed reform of corporate man-
agers. The second basis argues that more stringent state disclosure re-
quirements would facilitate the primary purposes of federal disclosure,
which are the protection of potential investors and increased confidence
in secondary capital markets. This Article argues that neither of these
ends is likely to result from the imposition of additional state-mandated
corporate disclosure.
This Article contends that current state corporate disclosure require-
ments are morally defensible both in their origins and in their current
functioning. Today, as in the past, shareholders' primary duty is to select
corporate directors. These directors, not the shareholders, set corporate
policy. Although the directors are accountable to the shareholders, they
are neither the shareholders' nor the corporation's agents. In other
words, directors are not subject to the control of shareholders.
Shareholders may either dismiss or reelect directors, but cannot instruct
them directly on corporate policy. Appropriate corporate disclosure
schemes should reflect this division of functions. This Article asserts that
the current state disclosure schemes fulfill this task.
Part I of this Article describes current corporate disclosure obligations
under Delaware law and the MBCA. Part II details the origins of the
modern system of state-mandated corporate disclosure, describing both
the traditional and the more nuanced and accurate version of that devel-
opment. Part III considers the moral calls for increased state corporate
disclosure obligations, and Part IV defends the morality of the current
state system.
I. STATE CORPORATE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF DELAWARE)
A. Delaware
In Delaware, the short answer to the question, "What disclosure must
a corporation make under state law?", is easy: "none." The more nu-
anced answer is: "next to none." The most salient disclosure require-
ment is the stockholder inspection right in Section 220 of the Delaware
Code,4 which is triggered only when a stockholder makes a written de-
mand on the corporation to inspect the corporation's books and records
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b)-(c) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
5. See id.
2000]
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This requirement is further cabined by two provisions. First, only stock-
holders of record can demand inspection of a corporation's books and
records.6 Beneficial holders, which includes shareholders who keep their
stock in street name, must act through the record holder. Second, the
requesting stockholder must demonstrate a "proper purpose ...rea-
sonably related to such person's interest as a stockholder."7
While the first of these restrictions is objective in that the corporation
must look only to its own stock record book, the second is quite subjec-
tive despite a fair amount of case law.' The indeterminacy of the second
requirement leaves open the possibility that a corporation may unfairly
refuse a stockholder's inspection request. This possibility most likely re-
duces the number of inspection requests and hence reduces the aggregate
amount of information disclosed by corporations to their stockholders.
One advantage afforded to stockholders is that once they demonstrate a
'proper purpose," they may inspect the corporation's records regardless
of whether they have additional, improper, purposes.9
Delaware's affirmative transaction disclosure obligations"' are primar-
ily obvious, otiose, or illusory." The most obvious obligation (and the
least important to this Article's thesis) requires Delaware officers or di-
rectors to disclose all material non-public information they possess to
persons with whom they trade when buying or selling the corporation's
stock.12
6. See id. § 220(b).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Security First Corp. v. United States Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d
563, 565, 566-71 (Del. 1997).
9. See, e.g., CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788, 792-93 (Del. 1982) (noting
that "once a proper purpose has been established, any secondary purpose or ulterior mo-
tive of the stockholder becomes irrelevant").
10. This Article, following traditional securities regulation conceptions, divides dis-
closure obligations into those that are triggered by a transaction and those that are trig-
gered periodically. Two examples of common disclosure obligations triggered by a trans-
action include when a corporation issues stock and when a corporation's shareholders
elect directors. An example of a periodic disclosure obligation is the Delaware state re-
quirement that corporations must file a franchise tax report annually with the Secretary of
State. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 502(a) (1991 & Supp. 1998). This report contains the
location of the corporation's registered office, the name of its registered agent(s), its prin-
cipal place of business, the names and addresses of all of its directors and up to two offi-
cers, and the corporation's capitalization. See id. Section 502 of the Delaware statute does
not require Delaware corporations to include financial information or to send this report
to their shareholders. See id.
11. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The Corpo-
rate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087-1178 (1996) (a most
wondrous article discussing Delaware's disclosure requirements).
12. See, e.g., Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278, 279, 281-82 (Del. 1977)
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When Delaware corporations solicit proxies from their shareholders,
they have an obligation to disclose all material facts reasonably avail-
able.13 In the absence of a proxy solicitation, however, Delaware corpo-
rations do not need to disclose any information to their stockholders be-
14
yond the simple notice of shareholder meetings. This is an otiose
requirement for public corporations because the Securities and Exchange
Commission already mandates such disclosures."
This disclosure obligation has force by virtue of state corporation laws
only when non-public Delaware corporations choose to solicit proxies.
Statistics illustrating how often such corporations solicit proxies are un-
available. Intuitively, however, such situations must be relatively rare
because most non-public corporations can rely on the fact that their
owners are sufficiently interested in corporate affairs to attend the an-
nual shareholder meeting. At any rate, non-public corporations can rely
on the holders of a majority of the shares to be present, which is the
Delaware Code's only requirement for the stockholders to act at a meet-
ing.1
Delaware law also contains a disclosure requirement that appears to
have some substance, but which is illusory in the end. When corpora-
tions seek shareholder approval of any action, shareholders must be pro-
vided with all material information reasonably available. 17 But this dis-
(dealing with a majority shareholder's disclosure of non-public information to minority
shareholders).
13. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 85, 87 (Del. 1992).
14. See id. at 85-86 (rejecting a duty of complete candor as to information provided in
pre-shareholder meeting notices). Delaware law provides that:
Whenever stockholders are required or permitted to take any action at a meet-
ing, a written notice of the meeting shall be given which shall state the place, date
and hour of the meeting, and, in the case of a special meeting, the purpose or
purposes for which the meeting is called.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222(a) (1991). But see Lynch, 383 A.2d at 279, 281-82 (stating
the disclosure of all germane information to minority shareholders as required in non-
proxy votes).
15. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13(a) (1999) (requiring reporting companies to disclose a
substantial list of various types of information of their proxies). SEC regulations require
companies to disclose vast amounts of information about their officers and directors. See
id. § 240.14a-101 (items 7 & 8 of information required in a proxy statement). If a reporting
company plans to hold a meeting during which shareholders will elect directors, SEC Rule
14a-3(b) requires the company to include an annual report to its security holders in con-
junction with its solicitation of proxies. See id. § 240.14a-3(b). This annual report to secu-
rity holders must include substantial information about the company's business, its finan-
cial condition, and the results of its operations. See id. §§ 240.14a-3(b)(1), (5)(ii), & (7).
16. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(1) (1991) (stating that unless the certificate of
incorporation or bylaws state otherwise, a majority of the shares entitled to vote in person
or by proxy shall constitute a quorum at a meeting).
17. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 84.
2000]
Catholic University Law Review
closure can be made at the meeting itself and shareholders who do not
attend have no right to have that disclosure sent to them."s In the ab-
sence of a shareholder vote, Delaware corporate shareholders are not
entitled to any information about the finances or affairs of corporations
in which they invest.'9 Furthermore, shareholders have no right to ask
questions at shareholder meetings. ' Management may refuse to enter-
tain shareholder questions, and may even cut shareholders off when they
are speaking.2'
This disclosure requirement undoubtedly seems important to the
shareholders who attend a stockholder meeting. Justice Holland of the
Supreme Court of Delaware recently validated this view when he stated
that the disclosure obligation requires directors "to provide shareholders
with all information that is material to the action being requested and to
provide a balanced, truthful account of all matters disclosed in the com-
munications with shareholders."22 Additional Delaware case law rein-
forces this interpretation. In 1997, the Supreme Court of Delaware held,
in Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co.,23 that shareholders have a
right to full disclosure even in electing an uncontested slate of directors. 4
This holding has important implications because all corporate power is
ultimately vested in the board of directors.25 Director elections, then,
even when uncontested, presumably trigger a corporation's obligation to
disclose every fact material to the corporation, so shareholders can make
informed decisions when casting or withholding their votes. Delaware
corporations must abide by this rule despite having no obligation to dis-
close any of the required information in writing, in advance of the meet-
26ing, or to shareholders who do not attend the meeting, if the directors
18. See id. at 87 (providing that Delaware law does not require the (1) purposes of or
(2) matters to be discussed at a shareholder meeting to be disclosed prior to the meeting
itself).
19. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998).
20. See Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 146 (Del. 1997) (not-
ing that complainant did not prove a shareholder right to ask a question).
21. See id. at 139 (describing a situation where management abruptly dismissed any
efforts by stockholders to comment or question the corporation's current affairs).
22. Malone, 722 A.2d at 12.
23. 700 A.2d 135 (Del. 1997).
24. See id. at 144.
25. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) (noting that, unless otherwise speci-
fied, the business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by the board of directors).
26. See Stroud v. Grace, 600 A.2d 75, 85 (Del. 1992) (emphasizing that Delaware law
merely requires notice of a shareholder meeting).
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21choose not to solicit proxies.
This requirement is truly stunning because it has only the most tenuous
connection to the theories of director legitimacy and shareholder fran-
chise. A shareholder's right to vote for directors is rooted in two con-
cepts: (1) the division of power between shareholders and the board, and
(2) the consent of the shareholders that these particular people serve as
directors to whom all corporate power is given. 8
Requiring full disclosure in the director election setting seems, on the
surface, to be a logical concomitant to this understanding of the impor-
tance of the franchise. Typically, however, directors run unopposed. In
such instances, full disclosure seems merely illusory in its protection of
shareholder voting power.
The limited range of shareholders' responses shows the disconnection
between disclosure and the franchise in the uncontested election setting.
First, a shareholder who, after full disclosure, deems the proposed direc-
tors to be unacceptable, can withhold his or her votes. Under Delaware
law, however, withheld votes do not affect the corporation, except in the
rarest of circumstances, because directors are elected by "a plurality of
the votes of the shares present."29 Given the legitimacy of advance-
notice bylaws, directors can effectively prevent nominations from the
floor, and hence any shareholder's vote would be sufficient to elect the
proposed slate. 0
Alternatively, shareholders who are determined to stymie director
elections could refuse to attend. On occasion, this tactic might prove ef-
fective. Delaware law states that no fewer than one-third of the shares
entitled to vote shall constitute a quorum at a shareholder's meeting for
action to be taken. In the overwhelming number of instances, however,
the controlling faction will control at least one-third of the votes. It
would be a highly unusual, though not impossible, setting in which dis-
27. Cf id. (noting that additional disclosure is not mandated "in the absence of a
proxy solicitation"). "We require proxy voters to have all material information reasonably
available before casting their votes." Id. at 87.
28. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988). Share-
holder voting for directors is the "ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of
directorial power rests." Id. at 659. "[It is critical to the theory that legitimates the exer-
cise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they
do not own." Id.
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (1991). In Delaware, a shareholder can only de-
feat the election of a slate of directors by withholding his or her votes if his or her withheld
votes are the only ones present in person or by proxy and entitled to vote on the election
of directors. See id. The likelihood of this occurring is virtually nil.
30. See Stroud, 606 A.2d at 95-96.
31. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (1991 & Supp. 1998).
2000]
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satisfied shareholders controlled more than two-thirds of the shares and
yet did not propose an alternative slate of directors. Consequently, this
Delaware rule that appears to guarantee disclosure for shareholders is
instead illusory.
Another rule that appears to protect shareholders but turns out to be
an illusion allows shareholders to recover damages for disclosure viola-
tions. The Delaware Supreme Court has clearly held that shareholders
may prevail in a disclosure violation action simply by showing the mate-
riality of the misstatement or omission.32 As a practical matter, however,
damages in excess of a nominal amount are not a serious remedy for fail-
ure to disclose.3
B. The Model Business Corporation Act
The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),3 4 which twenty-four
states have adopted,35 provides shareholders with more detailed inspec-
tion rights than Delaware law. Shareholders may inspect and copy the
following corporate documents without showing a proper purpose: (1)
basic constituent documents, (2) the names of the directors and officers,
(3) three years' worth of corporate actions, and (4) three years' worth of
financial statements.36 Shareholders who act in good faith and show a
proper purpose may inspect certain records reasonably related to that
purpose.37 Shareholders may also inspect the list of shareholders two
days after the corporation sends notice of an upcoming meeting to its
shareholders.38
Although the MBCA requires corporations to notify their sharehold-
ers about shareholder meetings, this statute does not otherwise mandate
affirmative transactional disclosure obligations upon corporations in
connection with shareholder actions. In two types of situations, however,
corporations must inform their shareholders of corporate actions even
though shareholders are not required to act. Specifically, a corporation
must tell its shareholders when it indemnifies a director in connection
with a derivative suit.39 A corporation must also notify its shareholders
32. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998).
33. See id. at 12 & n.27.
34. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT (3d ed. & Supp. 1998/99).
35. See id. at xxvii.
36. See id. §§ 16.02(a), 16.01(c), (e).
37. See id. § 16.02(b), (c)(1).
38. See id. § 7.20(b).
39. See id. § 16.21 (a).
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when it issues shares for promissory notes or future services. 40 The
MBCA further requires some periodic disclosure, as corporations must
annually send basic financial information to their shareholders.4 '1 This
requirement is more convenient for shareholders than the MBCA's dis-
closure obligations for other information (i.e., financial), which only re-
quire corporations to make such information available at their principal
offices.42
II. ORIGIN OF THE MODERN SCHEME
A. The Received Tradition
From William Z. Ripley in 1927, to the contemporary Joel Seligman,
the standard interpretation of the origins of the current state corporate
disclosure system has been consistent. 43 According to this story, the
states had been ineffective in providing useful disclosure to shareholders
and generally had been complicit with large corporations. The federal
government, therefore, stepped in to provide needed regulations, firm
yet fair, through the Securities Act of 193344 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.4' The upshot of this interpretation is that state disclosure
obligations have become irrelevant when they are not simply immoral.
The federal government arrogates the moral high ground by rescuing the
capital markets, and hence America, by restoring and ensuring market
integrity.
By the late 1920s, the American economy reached its highest levels
ever and seemed headed for even greater heights.4 Against this back-
ground, William Z. Ripley, a Harvard professor of political economy,
published his famous critique of corporate affairs, Main Street and Wall
40. See id. § 16.21(b).
41. See id. § 7.05(a)-(b).
42. See id. §§ 7.20(b), 16.02(a).
43. See WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927); JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (1982) [hereinafter
SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION]; Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General
Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249 (1976) [hereinafter Seligman, Brief His-
tory]. See generally 1 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 29-225; MICHAEL E. PARRISH,
SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 1-41 (1970).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994).
46. See generally JOHN BROOKS, ONCE IN GOLCONDA: A TRUE DRAMA OF WALL
STREET 1920-1938 65-85 (1969).
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Street.4 ' The most pervasive problem in regulating corporations was, ac-
cording to Ripley, "impublicity. ', 48 Ripley argued that state efforts to
compel disclosure would prove to be utterly futile. 9 More importantly,
he stated that the possibility of future state regulation promised very lit-
tle.50 The root of this failure originated from the states' lack of morality,
which contributed to their failure to adopt and enforce appropriate dis-
closure legislation. Ripley commended the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) for trying to raise the morality of corporate disclosure through
its listing standards. 2 The NYSE's attempts, however, generated limited
effects because the NYSE held suzerainty over few of the nation's corpo-
rations. 3 Ripley therefore concluded that federal regulation provided
the only solution. 4
Ripley believed that three groups were entitled to information on cor-
porations: (1) shareholders, (2) the government, and (3) the general
public." But Ripley rejected two salient theoretical grounds to support
this entitlement view, one of which Ripley treated as a non sequitur.1
6
Ripley railed against the other theoretical ground, which argued that
shareholders are entitled to disclosure because they are the ultimate
owners and called this the democratization of control argument. 7 In Ri-
pley's view, this argument could not support any disclosure requirements
47. See generally RIPLEY, supra note 43.
48. Id. at 156-57, 208.
49. See id. at 218.
50. See id. at 217.
51. See id. ("The pressure of local opinion in the case of important concerns can only
be overcome by exercise of these powers [i.e. legislation to compel disclosure] from a dis-
tance."); see also id. at 217-18 (explaining that "these local [Blue Sky] commissions ... al-
most inevitably become apologetic or compla[ce]nt when confronted by serious situations
in important close-by going concerns"); id. at 219 (concluding that "as to state activity we
are confronted, as always, with the lamentable diversity of morale").
52. See id. at 220.
53. See id. at 210, 213. "[S]ince 1920, under the leadership of the New York Stock
Exchange, the improvement in morale has been genuine and noteworthy. The influence
of it has not yet, however, fully permeated the precincts of the State House at Albany."
Id. at 220.
54. See generally id. at 220-22. Ironically, Ripley did not see a need for new legisla-
tion; the Sherman Act, as amended by the Federal Trade Commission Act, gave the fed-
eral government all of the power it needed to compel adequate corporate disclosure. See
id. at 222-23.
55. See id. at 165.
56. See id. at 165-66. Ripley noted the concession theory of the corporation, under
which states have various rights against corporations because states are the entities that
permit the organizers to incorporate. See id. Ripley never suggests any connection be-
tween the franchise and disclosure. See id.
57. See id. at 168-69.
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because the practicalities did not support the theory. Shareholders may
own a corporation in theory, but in practice, shareholders tend to be apa-
thetic and, largely, incompetent to assess any corporate disclosures."
Required corporate disclosure may advance sound management, but
only because experts mediate to the shareholders, but not because the
corporation, as the servant of its ultimate owners, has made disclosures
to the shareholders.59
Ripley ultimately grounded his argument for required corporate dis-
closure on instrumental considerations of social policy. The central vir-
tue of corporate disclosure, which Ripley called its ultimate defense, is
that disclosure will facilitate an accurate market price.6°
It is important to appreciate that Ripley was more concerned with
public rather than private virtues. In other words, Ripley was more con-
cerned with preserving general or diffuse societal virtues rather than
relatively well-defined or specific virtues. Ripley illustrates this concern
through his instrumental arguments in favor of disclosure, which were
societal rather than specific in nature. For example, Ripley argued that
disclosure would facilitate the virtues of national economic efficiency
while allowing the government to effect more easily the antitrust laws.
61
Ripley also believed that disclosure would help to reinforce rational tax
policy and smooth national labor relations.62
Ripley viewed the stock market as a public, societal asset rather than
one that primarily benefits individuals. In his view, the anonymity of the
modern securities market had replaced traditional, individualized, face-
to-face, transactions. 63 Ripley noted that the number of individual stock-
holders increased radically after World War I. This augured for a
societal interest in corporations, the market for their shares, and ulti-
mately for required corporate disclosure. Previously, the conception of
58. See id. at 169.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 169-70.
Must one reiterate that ... the registration of a fair market price, consonant with
the real earning power of the company, is a matter of daily and universal impor-
tance to every shareholder who may have occasion to buy or to sell securities?
This instance is worth citing just to drive home the main defense of the proposed
reform.
Id. at 219.
61. See id. at 166-67.
62. See id. at 168.
63. See id. at 206. "Among these influences [that encourage speculation rather than
investment are] ... the substitution of an open and impersonal market for narrow, over-
the-counter, and revealed transactions . I..." d
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shareholding had been almost entirely atomized and specific. 4 Because
corporate disclosure effects a reliable market price, neither the current
shareholders, who may or may not be interested in selling shares, nor
corporations seeking to issue more shares, benefit from such disclosure
as much as the public at large, which may buy shares from the corpora-
tion itself or its current shareholders.
What is the connection between Ripley's societal impetus for disclo-
sure and the morality of that disclosure? It is that the remedy for "im-
publicity" will be national in scope. Furthermore, the states cannot and
will not implement effective remedies in part because the states lack
what Ripley calls morale. 65 "[T]he most obvious, the simplest, the most
effective remedy of all" is for the Federal Trade Commission to exercise
its statutory powers to require disclosure by most corporations engaged
in interstate commerce.66
Let the right sort of [FTC] appointments be made; or let the
word go forth that the Federal Trade Commission is hencefor-
ward to address itself vigorously to the matter of adequate and
intelligent corporate publicity, and, taken in conjunction with
the helpful agencies already at work, the thing is as good as
done.67
Ripley argued that the states cannot effectively enforce a system of
corporate disclosure for several reasons.66 First, substantive state disclo-
sure rules would vary from one state to the next, and one state could not
enforce its rules in another state, thereby thwarting any effective disclo-
61sure scheme. Second, the states would be reluctant to enforce regula-
tions against local businesses.70 Third, state disclosure regulations, to the
extent they are conceptually of a piece with the blue sky statutes,7t would
64. See id. at 156 (contending that "[t]he sudden advent of widespread popular own-
ership of corporations since the [first] World War has created entirely new circumstances
and conditions in the business world").
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 228. Ripley suggested two other partial remedies. First, the NYSE should
continue raising its disclosure requirements. See id. at 210. The obvious limitation is that
the NYSE only has control over corporations that are listed on it. See id. at 213. Second,
shareholders should organize themselves, much as workers unionized, and work collec-
tively toward increased corporate disclosure. See id. at 214. Even Ripley is unsure about
the practicality of these solutions. See id. at 214-16.
68. See id. at 217-21.
69. See id. at 217-18.
70. See id.
71. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 34-41.
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72be aimed at preventing fraud rather than facilitating a market price.
Infused through these concerns is Ripley's opinion that the states are
simply not moral enough to impose effective mandatory disclosure on
their domestic corporations. 3 States would succumb to the pressure of
local opinion, as they did with attempts to prevent child labor.74 The
states would become apologetic and complacent.7 ' Apparently, Ripley
believed that the states' moral resolve is as lax in corporate matters as it
is in the area of private morals. 76 Finally, given the equal power of each
state, one state's higher standard of morality would simply drive the
problem to other states. 7
The most influential corporate commentators in the first half of the
twentieth century, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, also saw a dichot-
omy between the public, societal aspects of the securities market, and the
private, specific aspects of corporate law regulating the relations between
corporations and shareholders.78 Berle and Means, like Ripley, concen-
trated their attention on the societal need for corporate disclosure to fa-
cilitate the societal virtue of effective securities markets.79 They were
principally concerned with disclosure to prospective buyers, either upon
the initial issuance of shares, or in the secondary market.80 They were
72. See RIPLEY, supra note 43, at 219.
73. See id. at 217-18.
74. See id. at 217.
Heartbreaking experience in enforcement of factory legislation by local authority
is of record. "If I were to attempt to execute the present law (as to child labor),
this village would be too hot to hold me," was the way one of the Connecticut
school visitors put it at the time.
Id.
75. See id. at 217-18.
76. See id. at 219 ("Delaware and Nevada, one specializing in incorporation and the
other in divorce, have thus far refrained from enactment of any protective legislation of
the sort.").
77. See id. at 219-20 (observing that "then, again, as to state activity we are con-
fronted, as always, with the lamentable diversity of morale."); see also id. at 220 (quoting
an anonymous New York Deputy Attorney General as saying that "'[a] general house-
cleaning has ensued in the state of New York, and an exodus of undesirables to Florida,
Boston, Canada, and New Jersey').
78. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
79. See id. at 10-46. "[The investment bankers' pre-offering disclosure document]
serves a double function. It is the prospectus designed to attract buyers for the security. It
is also the bankers' disclosure of information upon which the market is expected to ap-
praise the securities." Id. at 301.
80. See id. at 301. Berle & Means argue that "[i]t becomes necessary, therefore, to
consider... first, the relation of the bankers' disclosure towards buyers [directly from the
investment banker] ... and second, the relation of the disclosure towards persons ... who
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not concerned with corporate disclosure to existing shareholders except
to the extent that such disclosure induced confidence in the prevailing
market price or effected a more accurate market price.8' This lack of
concern was based on Berle and Means' belief that stockholders are not
as interested in corporate governance as they are in the economic quali-
ties of their investments.8 Berle and Means gave only a glancing men-
tion to state-mandated corporate disclosure laws because, like Ripley,
they believed that state corporations law did not hold much hope of
greatly increasing social benefit.83 Unlike Ripley, however, Berle and
Means did not dwell on this argument. 84
With the exception of an occasional reference, 85 Berle and Means did
not consider whether state law disclosure systems were effective and did
not opine on whether the states' disclosure systems derived from a lack
of morality. Commentators should not attribute this lack of an explicit
moral judgment by Berle and Means to an inattention to state corpora-
tions laws generally. To the contrary, Berle and Means devoted much of
their book to a rather detailed description of the private property aspects
16of shareholding, which is firmly rooted in state corporate statutes. Ob-
servers should also not attribute this lack of moral judgment of the states
to Berle and Means' inattention to morality itself. The book deals, quite
explicitly, with the potential for corporate disclosure to manipulate stock
prices, and with the questionable morality of corporate managers who
may decide to manipulate disclosure for such purpose:
Disclosures made to the market, however, in theory are merely
buy in the open market...." Id. (emphasis added).
81. See id. at 317-19. "All of these [forms of corporate disclosure] relate to informa-
tion which.., would not otherwise be easily or accurately discovered by the market." Id.
at 317.
It is interesting to note how little relation this variety of disclosure bears to the
disclosures required by law .... [N]o state requires disclosure of the facts con-
sidered usual in the normal open market situation. It will be noticed that ... the
underlying assumption is that such information must be considered as a private
matter, of interest only to its shareholders; and even in that regard limits in the
extreme the information which the corporate management must make available,
even to its own shareholders.
Id. at 318.
In addition, "[t]here are no legal requirements necessitating disclosure of information to
creditors such as bondholders." Id. at 319.
82. See id. at 321 (observing that "[a] share of stock is primarily a capitalized expecta-
tion, valued by an open market appraisal of the situation existing in the corporation and
the industry").
83. See id. at 121.
84. See id. at 287.
85. See, e.g., id. at 318.
86. See generally id. at 127-288.
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informative. If made with the intention of inducing action, they
may easily be improper from a strictly ethical point of view,
save where the circumstances are peculiar; since it is not the
business of the management to create market movements ....
It is extremely dangerous for a management to make disclo-
sures with the direct object of inducing market action. To do so
may imply either the highest ethical intent of the managers, or
the most sordid motives of personal gain .... 87
This basic conception of the morality of corporate disclosure
requirements in the first quarter of the twentieth century became the
standard history of the impetus for the Securities Act of 1933. In this
version of history, after the 1929 stock market crash, the federal govern-
ment needed to impose a corporate disclosure regime because the states'
laws were too lenient and no other mechanisms existed to effect corpo-
rate disclosure. 8 This history often minimizes, however, the sea of
change that Felix Frankfurter, Benjamin Cohen, Thomas Corcoran, and
James Landis brought about in drafting the original Securities Act.89
Any push for more stringent state-imposed corporate disclosure re-
quirements quickly became irrelevant because the federal government
established a system that was much more efficient than state systems
could ever have been.
Shifting our attention away from state corporate laws as simply the
precursors to federal securities laws and back to state corporate laws on
their own terms, the standard interpretation declares that the states were
not simply inefficient, but were genuinely immoral in creating lax disclo-
87. Id. at 320, 325.
88. See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 43, at 39-41.
Roosevelt committed himself to the long-held populist and progressive goal of
superseding lax state corporation laws with more stringent federal standards. His
securities policy was an attempt to remedy the weaknesses in the four bodies of
state and private rules then in effect [state corporate laws, state blue sky laws, the
NYSE regulations, and the accounting profession's standards], which cumula-
tively failed to minimize fraud or unfairness in the initial sale of corporate securi-
ties.
Id. at 42; see also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 119-121.
89. See SELIGMAN, TRANSFORMATION, supra note 43, at 60-64.
The Securities Act of 1933 was a conservative response to the economic crisis
known as the depression .... Only by returning to the historical moment when
the 1933 Securities Act was fashioned can one fully appreciate how modest the
disclosure philosophy was in aim, how comparatively little effect on the economy
it was intended to have, and how fortuitous were critical aspects of its adoption.
Id. at 39-40; see also PARRISH, supra note 43, at 42 ("The principal architects and support-
ers of the 1933 Federal Securities Act were political moderates who labored against the
counselors of deliberate procrastination and the advocates of rash innovation."); DONALD
A. RITCHIE, JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 43-61 (1980).
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sure laws. Joel Seligman applied the criticism exemplified by Ripley's
work and used it to insinuate this idea.9° He particularly excoriated
Delaware for its pro-management corporations statute of 1899; its court
decisions, especially those from the late 1950s, that further limited share-
holder protections from management overreaching; and its corporations
statute of 1967.91 In all fairness, Seligman did not address corporate dis-
closure specifically. He did advert, however, to the relationship between
shareholder and management power,92 of which corporate disclosure is
emblematic. Throughout, Seligman suffused a broad judgment that
Delaware and other leading corporations law states have, in the twenti-
eth century, acted immorally in regulating their corporations.93
This standard interpretation notes that during the "golden age" of
American corporation law, the Jacksonian era, states replaced special
charters with general incorporation laws. These statutes represented an
advance over the previous special, ad hoc, charters that state legislatures
had been granting because they largely eliminated the monopoly privi-
leges that such charters frequently contained.94  This virtuous world
ended, however, with the explosion of large, multi-state business entities
after the Civil War. Those entities became constrained by state corpo-
rate law systems, in particular by the common law of corporations, which
made multi-state operations illegal.
In the 1890s, New Jersey entered the "charter-mongering" business,
enacting a "lax" corporate disclosure law.95 Seligman seems to have be-
lieved that a Gresham's Law96 of corporate regulation existed because he
reports that "social Darwinism was stood on its head, 97 and that, while
muckraking journalists and other commentators complained about New
Jersey,98 other states believed they had to adopt New Jersey's approach
to chartering corporations or risk losing important tax revenues. 99
Delaware followed New Jersey's lead by enacting its 1899 incorpora-
90. See generally Seligman, Brief History, supra note 43.
91. See id. at 253, 271-73, 279, 282, 284-85.
92. See id. at 258.
93. See id. at 283-86.
94. See id. at 257.
95. See id. at 264-65.
96. Thomas Gresham, "financial agent, expert, and wizard of Queen Elizabeth" in
the 16th century, formulated the proposition that "bad money drives out good," which is
known today as "Gresham's Law." JURG NIEHANs, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THEORY
21(1990).
97. Seligman, Brief History, supra note 43, at 269.
98. See id. at 268.
99. See id. at 269-70 (listing the types of laws states adopted during this era).
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tion statute, and has been the preeminently lax state since New Jersey's
brief period of reform in 1913 allowed other states to step to the fore.'00
The Delaware judiciary abets the Delaware General Assembly in this en-
terprise by systematically filling the interstices in the statute with deci-
sions that reinforce the regulation's laxity.'0 ' This view is certainly not
Seligman's alone, although he is the most nuanced proponent. Another
commentator, William Cary, has been the most often cited proponent of
the belief that state corporations laws are immoral. Cary, in a famous
1974 Yale Law Journal article, characterized the notion of states' compe-
tition for corporate charters as a race for the bottom."
B. Other Interpretations
The standard interpretation is not the only interpretation. The law and
economics movement, in particular, has considered disclosure require-
ments and the role of states versus the federal government. Law and
economics scholars share the standard interpretation's instrumental
views of disclosure-that disclosure is important only to the extent that it
facilitates the market for securities, and that the states are incompetent
to implement appropriate disclosure rules.
Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and Dean Daniel R. Fischel have been
leading theorists in the law and economics field over the past genera-
tion. °3 In their most sustained discussion of corporate disclosure, they
measured disclosure rules' efficacy by determining whether the rules
made the securities trading markets more economically efficient."
Easterbrook and Fischel were not concerned with the corporate govern-
ance effects of disclosure as a potential for shareholder monitoring of
management, or as a potential for non-economic yet socially desirable
corporate actions. They argued that the only appropriate measure of so-
cial utility is whether shareholders buy or sell stock at prices reflecting all
100. See id. at 270-71.
101. See id. at 283-84.
102. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 668-70, 672 (1974). For a discussion on the article's fame and influence,
see Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J.
1449, 1462 (1991). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444-
45 (1992) (explaining Cary's "race for the bottom" theory).
103. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
104. See id. at 311 ("The principal benefit asserted for mandatory disclosure is that
investors will make more money .... Society gains with investors, because wise invest-
ment means efficient matching of funds with projects.").
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information available about the issuer and in transactions with low costs.
The law and economics theory asks whether the states or the federal
government are the more appropriate regulator of corporate disclosure,
assuming that regulation is needed to supplement or supplant the market
for information. Easterbrook and Fischel believed that the states are en-
gaged in a competitive market to provide optimal disclosure rules. State
regulation would improve corporate disclosure because the coercive na-
ture of governmental regulation eliminates the collective action and free
rider problems of a free market for disclosure.05 State competition for
optimal regulation schemes is obviously lacking where the federal gov-
ernment imposes a single scheme unchecked by market forces. '°6 Despite
this fact, Easterbrook and Fischel believed that the states are not compe-
tent, primarily on moral grounds, to provide better disclosure than the
federal government."7
Another alternative to the standard interpretation is the mediating hi-
erarchy model of corporate law, sometimes called the team production
approach.08 The core of this approach is that the corporate enterprise is
105. See id. at 295-96.
106. See id. at 303. Easterbrook and Fischel contend that "[riegulation is more failure-
prone than markets, because there are few automatic forces that correct regulation gone
awry. The regulatory system lacks a competitor, and the very fact of regulation often sup-
presses the information necessary to detect regulatory failure." Id.
107. See id. at 300-02. Easterbrook and Fischel's morality argument is that states can
externalize the cost of disclosure for their citizens by requiring, either legislatively or judi-
cially, disclosure or damages for nondisclosure, of information that resident investors
would like but which is not produced under an optimal state regulation system. See id. at
301. In effect, state collective action problems may arise when states opportunistically-
immorally-exploit foreign corporations. See id. Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48
(2d Cir. 1991), decided after Easterbrook and Fischel wrote their book on this topic, illus-
trates just such danger. Only the federal government can eliminate the potential for state
exploitation by imposing a single regulatory scheme. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 103, at 302. A collateral argument that Easterbrook and Fischel made is that liability
for violating state disclosure regulations is inherently uncertain ex ante. See id. This is be-
cause issuers' costs of capital increase suboptimally because the potential liability in secu-
rities litigation is enormous. See id. The federal government's system of pre-disclosure
oversight reduces the ex ante risk and, overall increases investor wealth. See id. at 307-08;
see also Bebchuk, supra note 102, at 1444-48, 1490-94.
108. This approach originates in Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Produc-
tion Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout,
Team Production]. Recently, The Journal of Corporation Law published a symposium of
articles on this topic. This symposium included: Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999)
[hereinafter Blair & Stout, Introduction]; John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of
Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837
(1999); Viet D. Dinh, Codetermination and Corporate Governance in a Multinational
Business Enterprise, 24 J. CORP. L. 975 (1999); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That
the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L.
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a team production: more than one person is required, at least some of the
inputs are team-specific, and the profits are not easily attributable to any
particular person's efforts.1° From this economic insight comes the legal
conception of the corporate structure as a mediating hierarchy model, in
which the board of directors' role is to mediate among the team members
to divide the profits."0
Thus far, proponents of this mediating hierarchy model have not fo-
cused specifically on the question of corporate disclosure to sharehold-
ers, or used this model to explain the origins of the current corporate law
structure. Nonetheless, the mediating hierarchy model has obvious im-
plications for disclosure to shareholders. Because directors are key to
the corporate model, and because shareholders are only one among sev-
eral constituencies that the board must consider, disclosure to the share-
holders would seem to be relatively unimportant. Disclosure to the
board is central and disclosure to all constituencies might be desirable.
Disclosure to the shareholders, however, especially for any corporate
governance purposes, would seem unnecessary and misguided."'
C. The Real Origins of the Modern Scheme
The real story is much richer, more conflicted, and ultimately leads to
an understanding of the states' role as considerably more moral than
previously imagined. It suggests that the states made principled, ethical
choices about the corporate disclosure schemes they adopted, and that
the disclosure provisions of the federal securities acts usurped the states'
historic role, a role the states discharged honorably. In general, states
created their disclosure requirements primarily to protect present share-
holders. In other words, they facilitated corporate governance. Unlike
later federal reforms, the states were not concerned with market integrity
or with protecting unsophisticated people who might become sharehold-
112ers.
819 (1999); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24
J. CORP. L. 869 (1999); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L.
913 (1999); D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP.
L. 949 (1999); Eric Talley, Taking the "I" out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the
Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24 J. CORP. L. 1001 (1999); Steven M.H. Wallman, Under-
standing the Purpose of a Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 807 (1999).
109. See Blair & Stout, Introduction, supra note 108, at 745.
110. See id. at 746.
111. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 108, at 309 (noting directors'
roles in a privately held company vs. a publicly held company).
112. This part of the Article often refers to people who might become shareholders
and uses the term potential shareholders. These phrases mean individuals whose business
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Victor Morawetz, the author of the preeminent nineteenth century
treatise on corporate law, stated in 1886 that shareholders have a general
common law right to inspect their corporation's books and financial rec-
ords at any reasonable time for proper purposes."3 Morawetz observed
that many states' general incorporation statutes also provided an inspec-
tion right.114 By the 1880s, states had only recently replaced special stat-
utes, passed ad hoc by the legislature for each corporation, with general
incorporation statutes."5 Before 1820, in at least one prominent state,
the legislatures typically responded to the disclosure question by requir-
ing corporations to make certain financial information available to the
shareholders once each year, usually at the annual meeting." 6
This statutory obligation was apparently in addition to the common
law rule of general shareholder access. 17 By 1830, state legislatures
changed their views about the appropriate processes for mandating cor-
porate disclosure. Legislatures began to require corporations to make
financial information available continuously to their shareholders. "8 This
effectively memorialized the inspection rule that Morawetz described,
but typically did not require corporations to make a formal report to
shareholders at the annual meeting.
These general shareholder access rules demonstrate a clear policy:
shareholders have a right to information about their company so that
they may exercise their franchise intelligently.19 The earliest modern
treatise writer, Morawetz, understood that shareholder power over a
corporation is aggregate in nature, rather than being a power residing in
each shareholder 2 A shareholder majority has the power to bind the
corporation."' Shareholder power, however, is nearly exclusively re-
duced to the annual election of the corporation's directors. Directors
is not the buying and selling securities nor long-term investments in securities. Although
this Article uses the term "potential investors," this Article recognizes that they may al-
ready own securities of other corporations.
113. See 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 473 (2d ed. 1886).
114. See id.
115. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 56 (1970).
116. See JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND
POLITICS 1791-1875 319 (1949).
117. See State ex rel. Rosenfeld v. Einstein, 46 N.J.L. 479, 482-83 (1884).
118. See CADMAN, supra note 116, at 320.
119. See 6 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON & JOSEPH W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4525, at 411-12 (Edward F. White ed., 3d ed. 1927).
120. See MORAWETZ, supra note 113, § 238.
121. See id. § 447.
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have all corporate power, and shareholders' remedy for incumbent direc-
tors of whom they disapprove is to vote them out at the next annual
shareholder meeting.1
22
These approaches were not designed to protect creditors, securities
markets, or potential investors. This does not mean, however, that these
groups have been without legal protections. As Willard Hurst pointed
out, for example, creditors used contract language, and their consider-
able bargaining power, to protect their investments when lending money
to corporations. 23
Because secondary markets did not exist for the vast majority of cor-
porations there was simply nothing for states to protect yet. Protecting
individuals who contemplate the purchase of securities is often simply a
corollary of protecting the secondary markets; secondary markets cannot
flourish if investors lack confidence in the securities they are considering
purchasing. Potential investors are more likely to buy shares, and secon-
dary markets are more likely to be healthy, if these potential investors
are entitled to more information. But this virtue is, obviously, missing to
the extent no secondary markets existed for states to protect.' Thus, the
theory was to protect potential investors for the investors' own sakes,
rather than to protect indirectly the secondary markets. The common
law provided remedies against selling shareholders who committed
fraud 126 and against corporations and promoters that lied to potential
shareholders to sell shares.27
Did the states' approach to corporate disclosure effect the ends the
states desired? More precisely, did the rule of access, supplemented on
occasion by a rule of required disclosure, enhance shareholders' corpo-
122. See id. § 237.
123. See HURST, supra note 115, at 54-55; see also ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR.,
HENRY VARNUM POOR 205-225 (1956) (noting that large corporations such as railroads
felt compelled to disclose corporate information to such influential business publications
as Poor's Manual.)
124. See id. at 91. The New York Stock Exchange, the only prominent secondary
market for American securities, began to address disclosure in 1866 and first imposed a
disclosure requirement in 1900. See id.
125. See generally VINCENT P. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 240-54 (1970). Public offerings of securities, in the modern sense, and the sub-
sequent proliferation of the number of companies whose securities are traded in the sec-
ondary market, are post World War I developments. See id.
126. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 429, 431, 434 (1909); Diamond v. Orea-
muno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969).
127. See, e.g., Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 74 N.E. 653,
655,659 (Mass. 1905); cf Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210
U.S. 206,216 (1908).
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rate governance abilities? The traditional story denies that these ap-
proaches worked, but the true answer is that they did work, especially
considering the specific role that shareholders played. Shareholders had
to select the managers each year. The shareholders, however, were not
allowed to manage the company themselves, not even at the most ab-
stract level of setting general corporate policy. The corporation's charter
set out, fairly specifically, the corporation's business; the directors and
officers designed and implemented strategies to effect most profitably
this described business."' The shareholders' task each year was to con-
firm or replace the managers. Perhaps most importantly, shareholders
were not considered "principals" in the sense that modern agency law
understands that term, which is a person who has the right to control an
agent's performance.129
The traditional story declares that states made the wrong choice when
they moved away from required corporate disclosure to the access sys-
tem. 30 This is because corporations were expected to resist inspection
requests, which would lead to a significant rise in shareholder costs to
exercise their inspection rights. Furthermore, an effective records in-
spection often requires exactly the sort of information that a required re-
port furnishes, but which a shareholder often might not have, and might
not know to ask about.
13'
The requirement that the corporation submit a report to its stockhold-
ers appears, at first blush, to be the preferable solution simply because it
allows shareholders to be passive. But, these reports have many limita-
tions. One such limitation stems from a common state requirement that
128. State statutes typically required corporate charters that specify the corporation's
purposes and powers. In the late 1960s, legislatures amended these statutes to provide
that corporations could list their purpose as engaging in any lawful business. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(3) (1991) (adopted by 56 Del. Laws 50 (1967)). Long be-
fore this statutory change, state legislatures largely freed corporations from the burden of
having to state their purposes explicitly. In 1940, a leading corporations textbook devoted
more than 10% of its pages (158 out of 1286) to the question of corporate power, suggest-
ing that the issue was important in corporate practice. See 1 E. MERRICK DODD, JR. &
RALPH J. BAKER, CASES ON BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CORPORATIONS 313-471 (1940).
By 1970, the fourth edition of that casebook treated the problem in barely 1% of its pages
(22 out of 1816). See WILLIAM L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
32-34, 50-69 (4th ed. 1970). As early as 1948, though, another leading casebook confessed
that "[ajt all events, when a true question of 'ultra vires' is raised under a modern charter,
it is generally a proof of poor draftsmanship on the part of the incorporation lawyers."
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (CORPORATIONS)
46 (Adolf A. Berle & William C. Warren eds., 1948).
129. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (1958).
130. See HURST, supra note 115, at 89-90.
131. Seeid. at 89.
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corporations submit the report at the shareholder annual meeting.'
Admittedly, this is a logical requirement because shareholders vote for
the corporation's managers at this annual meeting.'33 Although, most
states required corporations to hold their annual meeting within the state
of incorporation, this was often a considerable distance away, by nine-
teenth and early twentieth century standards, from where many corpora-
tions' shareholders lived. Furthermore, corporations' growing accep-
tance of shareholder proxies, well established by the turn of the century,
diminished shareholder incentive to attend the annual meeting, as well as
manager incentive to have shareholders attend. Thus, the efficacy of
required reports was limited because many shareholders would not, in
fact, receive the information.
Another limitation is that many statutes apparently permitted corpora-
tions to report to shareholders orally, which is problematic for various
reasons. Stockholders would surely be unable to apprehend detailed,
nuanced, or complex information. Corporations could make uninten-
tional, not to mention outright fraudulent, misrepresentations in an oral
report. In either case, a shareholder would have great difficulty authen-
ticating for purpose of litigation information provided orally.
Written annual reports would not have been of much more value. In
the days before inexpensive, easy document duplication, statutory provi-
sions requiring corporations to provide written reports generally meant
that all of a corporation's shareholders had access to only a single copy of
the report.' Presumably, each shareholder could make a copy during
the time allotted for inspection. That power, however, might be of little
practical use. Shareholders who did not attend the annual meeting
would have to make inspection demands to see these written reports.
In effect, an annual report provision was merely an illusory means of
supplementing a shareholder's common law inspection right. Sharehold-
ers who did not attend the annual meeting, and thus could only obtain a
written report by exercising inspection rights, only benefited from this
report requirement by having access to a particular form of report, which
132. See CADMAN, supra note 116, at 319.
133. See DODD AND BAKER, supra note 128, at 698, 721-22; see also CADMAN, supra
note 116, at 319.
134. See 1 SEYMOUR D. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 875 (2d ed. 1908). For a description of the development of proxies in
America, see Leonard H. Axe, Corporate Proxies, 41 MICH. L. REV. 38, 38-50 (1942).
135. This interpretation is buttressed by provisions in some states that required corpo-
rations to transmit written reports to each shareholder. See DODD & BAKER, supra note
128, at 698, 721-22.
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few states required with any specificity. 1 6 Furthermore, to the extent
that the annual report requirement supplanted inspection rights, share-
holders depended entirely on management's convenience to utilize their
inspection right; shareholders could inspect and copy important informa-
tion only at the annual meeting, which management generally convened
at a time and place of their choosing.
The role of state corporate law disclosure regulations became richer,
though less linear, in the years following World War I. Floatation of new
issues of securities increased. These new issuances tended to be common
stock rather than debt, and they were more frequently marketed to indi-
vidual investors of modest resources who were located throughout the
country. For the first time, these floatations were effected by under-
writing syndicates of investment bankers rather than by the issuing com-
panies or single bankers. This change greatly increased the number of
stockholders, which meant that more people were affected by the tradi-
tional state disclosure rules."' It also meant that secondary trading mar-
kets beyond the New York Stock Exchange became more prominent.
The Curb Exchange, located at the very front door of the NYSE itself,
and the regional exchanges, which extended all the way to the Pacific
Ocean, became important. 38
This sea of change in corporate finance also meant that government
found a new constituency that needed protection: potential investors.
Such potential investors were located throughout the nation and, with
the post-War economic boom in the United States, the number of such
potential investors grew rapidly. The government needed to protect po-
tential investors during initial issuance and in the secondary trading set-
tings. Unlike most corporate creditors in prior eras, these potential in-
vestors were not sophisticated and did hot have bargaining power to
obtain favorable contract protections from issuers or selling sharehold-
ers.
The states responded to these changes by retaining their existing dis-
closure requirements. They did not see a need to change the system sim-
ply because more citizens became shareholders. Shareholders' role in
corporate governance thus remained unchanged. The fact that there
136. See HURST, supra note 115, at 90.
137. See JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 190 (1997) (stating that "the number of individuals owning com-
mon shares ... increased from a mere half million in 1900 to two million in 1920 and to ten
million in 1930.").
138. See ROBERT SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE 172 (1970).
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were more individual corporate shareholders did not change the appro-
priate level and method of giving them information so that they could
fulfill their role. Willard Hurst and others argued that shareholders
needed increased protection in this post-World War I era, because the
nature of capital formation changed and because of the increased com-
plexity of major corporations whose securities were being sold across the
country. For the first time, corporations' business activities swept the na-
tion, which concomitantly increased the scope of their internal manage-
ment requirements. Shareholders, therefore, needed increased disclo-
sure to understand the workings of these new corporations.
As the law and economics scholars point out, however, this argument
ignores the effect of at least three kinds of constraints on corporate man-
agement which made increased disclosure to shareholders less necessary:
the product market, which was becoming national in scope; the capital
market, in which a small number of sophisticated investment bankers de-
cided which corporations would and would not receive capital; and the
market for the new middle managers which created incentives for them
to manage efficiently1 4 More fundamentally, this argument ignores the
conceptual role of shareholders in the life of the corporation. Share-
holders annually vote for the directors for the ensuing year. In the nor-
mal course of events, shareholders can assume that at least a substantial
proportion of the directors will seek reelection. Furthermore, share-
holders generally may assume that these directors have done a creditable
job in discharging their duties during the past year. In any event, the
shareholders are not the ultimate principals. They are owners only in a
residual sense and are not potentially active managers themselves.
The states responded to the potential investors' perceived needs by
adopting two sorts of requirements. First, some states adopted provi-
sions requiring corporations to make certain information publicly avail-
able by filing this information with the state.14' This requirement allowed
current shareholders to have access to information. However, state leg-
islatures enacted these provisions primarily to aid potential investors in
making investment decisions, not to address corporate governance con-
cerns. The second way that states responded to the changes in corporate
capital formation was by adopting "Blue Sky" laws. Starting with Kansas
139. See HURST, supra note 115, at 89.
140. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 5-6, 11-12 (1977) (examining how changes in in-
dustry "permitted administrative coordination to be more profitable than market coordi-
nation").
141. See DODD & BAKER, supra note 128, at 727-28.
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in 1911, states imposed these regulations to protect consumers and, to a
certain extent, to encourage market integrity. 14 Although state legisla-
tures directed these regulations at issuers, these legislatures primarily in-
tended to affect investment bankers and broker-dealers, who were the
intermediaries of capital and the points of contact with potential inves-
tors. States certainly did not aim these regulations at current sharehold-
ers and did not intend to affect corporate governance.
From the 1929 stock market crash, through the ensuing Great Depres-
sion, the states responded minimally to questions of the appropriate level
of corporate disclosure. They initially gave current shareholders infor-
mation rights to ensure that the shareholders' limited corporate govern-
ance role would be effectively discharged. After World War I, some
states included measures to protect potential investors, provisions that
also enhanced market integrity. None of these changes, financial or le-
gal, changed the conceptual role of shareholders in the management of
corporations. Furthermore, states did not intend to rectify the corporate
disclosure system through legal responses because they deemed that sys-
tem to be appropriate already.
In light of the true, richer account of the development of state corpo-
rate law disclosure requirements, one can see that the federal govern-
ment did not enact the securities acts to rescue the American economy
from the incompetent and immoral states. Instead, Congress chose to
enact these securities acts to resolve a different, though related, problem:
the care and feeding of the national securities markets. Thus, the answer
to the question of whether the states' disclosure system is a moral one is:
yes. The key, again, is a proper understanding of the shareholders' role
in the corporate form and the states' conception of the best way to en-
hance the performance of that role.
At the earliest day of the modern American business corporation,
shareholders' primary function involved investing their capital in return
for the right to receive an aliquot share of the enterprise's excess profits
and, perhaps, some profit at a future date by selling that interest. The
management of that collected capital was put in the hands of a few peo-
ple. Those managers-in corporate law theory called directors-had, as
a collective body, all of the corporate power. Their job was to manage
this capital in the best economic interest of all of the shareholders, but
the shareholders were not the ultimate managers. They did not set cor-
porate goals, which were fairly specifically fixed in the corporation's ini-
tial charter. Shareholders also did not set the corporation's policy or
142. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 34-41.
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strategy. The directors had to answer to the shareholders each year, but
not the same way that an employee answers to an employer and not the
same way that an agent answers to a principal. Rather, shareholders'
status was something akin to the beneficiary of a trust. Although much
writing has debunked the notion that a corporation is a trust for share-
holders or creditors and that directors are trustees, the trust analogy is
apt in this relatively narrow setting. Shareholders have a strong interest
in how directors run their corporations and thus are the ultimate recipi-
ents of the business's gain. However, they are not charged with the
firm's management. Even if shareholders act collectively, they may not,
in classical corporate theory, run the corporation themselves. The core
of this distinction is that shareholders only select managers-they do not
delegate power to them that shareholders could retain for themselves.
States came to a relatively uniform approach to resolve the question of
the information shareholders need to discharge their function of passing
on the corporation's management. The amount of information the states
considered adequate and the method by which corporations communi-
cate that information to the shareholders is debatable. However, the
states' position was certainly the product of a principled and moral
choice about the appropriate division of authority within the business
corporation and the concomitant mechanics of implementing corporate
governance: these flow logically from that division of authority.
III. THE MORAL CLAIMS FOR EXPANDED STATE DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS
The point of much of the preceding discussion is that states initially
created their corporate disclosure schemes with principled and ethical
value choices about the appropriate allocation of corporate power be-
tween shareholders and directors. 14 '3 This Article now argues that the two
claims that commentators usually assert as moral grounds to support ex-
panded state corporate law disclosure are ultimately inadequate.
A. Management Reform
The primary moral argument for expanded state disclosure require-
ments is that management can be reformed. There are two variations on
this management redemption claim. The first argument asserts that
managers who are required to disclose more information may come to
see that their corporate strategies are wrongheaded and thus will want to
143. Cf. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 78, at 320, 325 (stating that corporate disclosure
could be unethical if intended to affect the market price).
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change them. The second version of the argument is that because of in-
creased disclosure, other corporate constituencies will impose reform on
the corporate managers.
This analysis of the possibility of management reform, however, begs
an important question: whether corporate managers' ethical choices need
to be reformed. Well-established corporate law posits that courts give
corporate managers extremely broad discretion to set corporate policy.
The discretion of corporate managers is restrained primarily when they
144have an interest that is adverse to the corporation. Furthermore, man-
agers must comply with the requirement that, whenever acting, they must
use a fairly minimal degree of care. 45 Legislatures sometimes codify
these requirements,1 46 but otherwise constrain corporate managers' ac-
tions by regulating certain areas of action, such as bribes to foreign per-
sons or environmental protection.147 In the vast majority of decisions,
corporate managers at every level of authority believe they are acting
morally. In some cases, these reformers would have managers choose
different courses of action. These alternative actions may be equally
genuine and equally moral, but are rarely superior morally.
From the view of the state, if states have the power, indeed, the obliga-
tion, to impose the prevailing morality on corporate managers, then on
what principled basis should the states choose something other than the
morality of corporate managers? If managers select a course of action
that they genuinely believe in and which is objectively moral, states
should not impose a different course of action on the ground that it is
more ethical and moral, than the one chosen by the managers. This ap-
proach allows states to impose safety obligations and other restrictions
on corporate activity on the ground that contrary choices by managers
are, ultimately, immoral.
1. Reform by Management
The first, and most salient, moral argument for expanding corporate
disclosure is that it will lead to reform of corporate behavior by corpo-
rate managers, principally directors and senior management. Although
this approach has been tried in several settings, it has often proved inef-
fective.1
48
144. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710-11 (Del. 1983).
145. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
146. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (1998).
147. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a),(c)-(f) (1994);
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
148. See, e.g., Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1997).
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Except in the unusual case of genuinely illegal corporate activity, dis-
closure will not typically lead to corporate reform. The vast majority of
corporate managers believe that, daily they make moral choices for the
corporation, its shareholders, other corporate constituencies such as sup-
pliers, customers, employees, neighbors, the society in which the corpo-
ration does business, and of course the managers themselves.
Corporate managers, like all other humans, do not always act in accor-
dance with the perfect economic rationality predicted by classical eco-
nomic theory. The study of this non-rational behavior is systematized by
behavioral economics. A subset of this inquiry focuses its attention on
the non-rational behavior of organizations and their managers. Re-
cently, Donald Langevoort culled institutional organization theory litera-
ture and suggested ways that managers' non-rational perceptions may,
systematically and persistently, skew organizational behavior.9
Langevoort suggested that the institutional organization theory literature
would be "useful[] in a wide range of legal settings, and thereby prompt a
research agenda to build on" that literature. "
For Langevoort, a central quality of corporate management is that,
even in relatively small corporations, the senior managers lack first-hand
knowledge of the business operations. Rather, front-line supervisors and
middle managers have access to substantial important information that
must be sent selectively to senior managers. 5' The less senior managers
often send information upward because this information is significant or
unusual, or both.152
Langevoort identified four persistent biases, in which he convincingly
The Loudon court held that "'a [corporate] board is not required to... draw legal conclu-
sions implicating itself in a breach of fiduciary duty from surrounding facts and circum-
stances prior to a formal adjudication of the matter."' Id. (quoting Stroud v. Grace,
606 A.2d 75, 84 n.1 (Del. 1992)). The federal securities acts and the cases interpreting
them primarily focus on disclosure of criminal convictions and, possibly, criminal acts that
do not involve convictions. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION 225-31 (8th ed. 1998). As on the corporate side, the courts have often shied
away from requiring disclosure under the securities laws of "bad" things that are not ille-
gal. See id.
149. See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Mak-
ing in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Donald C.
Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock
Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. A. L. REV. 101 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Langevoort, Organized Illusions]; Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation In An
Electronic Age: The Impact of Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779 (1997). For
citations to the institutional organization theory literature, see Langevoort, Organized Il-
lusions, supra, at 103 n.6, 104 n.10, 108 n.20, & 130 n.101. But cf id. at 109 n.23.
150. Langevoort, Organized Illusions, supra note 149, at 108 (citation omitted).
151. See id. at 119-26.
152. See id. at 136.
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argued, result in managers' strict adherence to a course of action against
objective contrary evidence. "3 First, cognitive dissonance may impede
corporate managers, subsequent to analyzing a business situation and
committing the corporation to a particular course, from admitting that
flaws existed in either the original analysis or commitment, or that sub-
sequent events made the analysis or commitment suboptimal.
5 4
In a second and related bias, managers exhibit a persistent tendency
against re-analyzing new information because of intellectual and emo-
tional limits on their ability to re-process information continually."'
Managers tend to view new data as confirming, if at all possible, the
original analysis. 116 This predilection is exacerbated when managers work
in teams because teams simplify the results of their analysis to reach an
agreement more easily and then implement a course of action.' Conse-
quently, the bias against re-analyzing information becomes increasingly
problematic because the original analysis is more simplistic than the
original data warranted.
158
The third bias is that managers are often systematically overoptimistic
about their managerial skills.9 This bias leads managers to discount the
potential adverse effects of new data or data that is inconsistent with
their original analysis) 6°
The tendency of managers to identify their own preferences and values
with optimum corporate policy is the fourth, and most germane of
Langevoort's persistent biases. 61 To the extent that senior managers of a
corporation exhibit this bias, corporate policy in the largest sense, is es-
tablished.162 Langevoort suggests that the pervasiveness of a particular
belief throughout a corporation's management structure is indicative of
whether that belief is objectively supported or is more likely a senior
managers' self-serving bias. 63 If a belief is not widely shared throughout
the corporation, and therefore reflects the senior management group's
shared bias, the senior group's power is usually sufficient to make the
senior group's belief official corporate policy that must be implemented
153. See id. at 133.
154. See id. at 142-43.
155. See id. at 135-39 (defining the bias against revision).
156. See id. at 136-37.
157. See id. at 137.
158. See id. at 137-39.
159. See id. at 137.
160. See id. at 139-41.
161. See id. at 143-46 (discussing the self-serving belief bias).
162. See id. at 145.
163. See id.
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by other managers who do not share the bias1M
The conditions that allow these biases to persist are also important.
After all, a central consequence of a strong market system is that rational
economic actors will drive non-rational economic actors, (i.e. firms, and
individuals that form policy) out of business. If this is true, biases are in-
teresting as pathology, but nothing more.
Donald Langevoort identifies both economic and psychological theo-
ries that hypothesize as to why these biases might persist for significant
periods.' Economically, Langevoort recognizes that firms often com-petein iperfct , 166
pete in imperfect markets, which arise because of one company's com-
petitive success.1 67 Because of one company's success, that firm is less
likely to respond to forces of the product, capital, and managerial mar-
kets.' 68 Thus, market imperfections permit firms with biases to thrive for
substantial periods before market forces respond. 69 Further, as firms and
markets become increasingly complex, there will be fewer instances in
which a particular course of action is deemed non-rational.70 Therefore,
managers and outsiders may have difficulty perceiving whether a deci-
sion is the product of rationality or non-rationality1 '
As to the psychological bases for bias persistence, Langevoort suggests
that bounded rationality focuses a firm on tasks it has historically done
well." Langevoort also suggests that a consistently optimistic bias can
have the beneficial effect of encouraging firms and employees to take
risks, which if not carried too far, can help bring about economic suc-
173cess.
The upshot of Langevoort's observations, in the context of corporate
morality, is that managers are unlikely to reform their behavior when
they visibly fail to act in the corporation's best interest. 74 Instead, man-
agers tend to ignore objective indications that their actions are inappro-
priate and tend to recharacterize this failure in self-serving terms.
17
1
164. See id. At a relatively theoretical level, this situation is the kernel for the humor
in any number of Dilbert comic strips.
165. See id. at 149-51.
166. See id. at 149-52.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 150-51.
169. See id. at 149-52.
170. See id. at 151.
171. See id. at 151-52.
172. See id. at 152.
173. See id. at 153-56.
174. See id. at 153-54.
175. See id. at 154.
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The reform efforts undertaken by Caremark International, Inc. pro-
vide a notable and anecdotal example of the intractability of manage-
ment reform through mandatory corporate disclosure. C.A. Lance Pic-
colo, a strong-willed chief, ran Caremark's two business lines.176 The less
important line provided managed care services to health professionals.
These services included acquiring or providing business services to physi-
cian practice groups.177 Caremark's more important line of business pro-
vided outpatient goods and services. 178 These goods and services, usually
referred to as "home health care," included physical and rehabilitativeS179
therapies, and therapeutic drugs for a variety of patient needs.
The home health care industry was profitable and ready to explode in
importance and profitability in the early years of the Clinton administra-
tion."O This industry, however, is also subject to clear and serious
abuses."" The root of the problem is the inability of private and govern-
mental entities that typically pay for home health care services to exert
sufficient oversight in the home setting.182 By contrast, in a hospital set-
ting, health professionals and hospital administrators can accurately
monitor whether goods and services are needed, actually provided, and
properly charged for.88 Typical abuses include charging for goods and
services that were never provided and overcharging for goods and serv-
ices actually provided.'4 Another common abuse involves various forms
of kickbacks to induce health care professionals either to prescribe un-
necessary goods and services to patients or to steer patients who do need
home health care to the company's products."185
Caremark contracted with hospitals and health care providers to ren-
der advice, consult, do research, and monitor patients receiving Care-
mark goods and services in their homes.'86 This helped Caremark im-




179. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 94C4751, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8751, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 1996); In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d
959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
180. See Linda Himelstein, Is Fraud Poisoning Home Health Care?, BUS. WK., Mar.
14, 1994, at 70-71.
181. See id. at 70.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 72.
185. See id.
186. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 962 (Del. Ch.
1996).
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prove its goods and services, and thus to retain its position as the leading
home health care provider in an increasingly competitive market.1 The
people and entities with whom Caremark contracted, however, also had
the power to prescribe or recommend Caremark's goods and services;
this created the possibility that at least some of the contracts that Care-
mark entered into were actually kickbacks, rather than legitimate con-
tracts for advice, consultation, research, or monitoring.
Caremark knew the dangers of these contractual relationships.189 Thus,
in 1989, Caremark promulgated its Guide to Contractual Relationships
that went through five editions by 1994, to guard against its 7000 em-
ployees and 90 branch offices from entering into disguised kickback ar-
rangements.' 9 Caremark also revised its standard contracts to comply
with some narrow safe harbor regulations adopted by the Department of
Health and Human Services in July 1991.9 Caremark also had an Ethics
Committee of its board of directors and had an in-house audit depart-
ment, which ensured Caremark's compliance with the law and Care-
mark's ethics policies.192
Nonetheless, in late 1991, the Department of Health and Human
Services began investigating Caremark's practices, which in turn led the
Department of Justice and a number of states to launch investigations of
their own.193 In response to these investigations, Caremark discontinued
its payments to health care professionals who provided monitoring serv-
ices. 94 Caremark's home office increased its oversight of the branch of-
fice actions and increased its employee training programs.' 95 Caremark's
board continued to evaluate the company's actions by receiving reports
from in-house and outside legal counsel."' The board also commissioned
at least one assessment from its financial auditor that concluded that
there were no material weaknesses in the internal legal and ethical
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 963 ("Although there is evidence that inside and outside counsel had
advised Caremark's directors that their contracts were in accord with the law, Caremark
recognized that some uncertainty respecting the correct interpretation of the law ex-
isted.").
190. See id. at 962-66. "Each version of the Guide stated... that no payments would
be made in exchange for or to include patient referrals." Id. at 962.
191. See id. at 962.
192. See id. at 963.
193. See id. at 962.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 962-63.
196. See id.
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auditing structure."'
In the fall of 1994, after a four-year investigation, federal indictments
of Caremark were handed up.'98 Within twenty-four hours, one of Care-
mark's shareholders filed the first of five shareholder derivative actions
in the Delaware Court of Chancery9 About a year later, a number of
insurance companies threatened Caremark with litigation on the ground
that Caremark's home health care billing practices defrauded them of200
money. In September 1996, two years after the first indictment and six
years after the government's first investigation, Caremark settled the last
of these disputes.' Caremark paid approximately $164 million to settle
the federal and state government claims and paid the insurance compa-
nies approximately $98 million.2 2 Caremark paid $262 million in total,
which does not include the attorney fees and other associated costs that
Caremark spent to investigate, litigate, and settle these claims 203 Al-
though Caremark did not settle the shareholder derivative suits with
monetary payments to their shareholders, Caremark paid just under $1
million to the shareholders' attorneys.
Caremark's story is germane to this Article because, throughout all the
investigations and indictments, the federal government never indicted or
implicated Caremark's senior officers or directors. 5 In fact, one specifi-
cally negotiated provision of the governmental settlement was that "no
senior executive of Caremark participated in, condoned, or was willfully
ignorant of wrongdoing., 20° In the shareholder derivative action, Chan-
cellor Allen also found that the Caremark board had no knowledge of
any wrongdoing, nor did it fail to exercise sufficient oversight over the
207company's actions. Yet, the board clearly knew about, indeed, estab-
lished as corporate policy, the business practices that, when they were
abused in predictable ways by lower level employees, cost the company a
197. See id. at 963.
198. See id. at 960.
199. See id. at 964 (noting that the original complaint alleged that Caremark's direc-
tors "breached their duty of care by failing to supervise the conduct of Caremark's em-
ployees").
200. See id. at 966.
201. See id. at 965-66.
202. See id. at 965 n.10, 966.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 965 n.13, 972.
205. See generally id. at 960-72.
206. Id. at 965 (quoting Chancellor Allen's opinion, not the governmental settlement
itself).
207. See id. at 971-72.
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quarter of a billion dollars.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required Caremark to disclose, at
least quarterly, all material information about the company. This re-
porting requirement mirrors the proponent's argument that expanded
state disclosure should produce management reform: where a corpora-
tion's management does not act criminally, but nonetheless acts in a way
that is distinctly deleterious to the corporation and its shareholders. The
proponents' argument is at odds with Donald Langevoort's arguments
pertaining to the systematic and persistent non-rational economic be-
havior of businesses. Clearly, the Caremark management did not reform
itself.
Caremark's story identifies qualities that are consistent with
Langevoort's suggestions. Two typical biases suggest themselves as
having played a part in the Caremark disaster. First, the managers' sys-
tematic over-optimism may have led the managers to believe that they
and Caremark would not engage in unethical or illegal practices, barring
the inevitable, isolated instances that any corporation of moderate size
would encounter. Furthermore, such optimism may have led the manag-
ers to believe that Caremark would not be subject to investigation or ul-
timately face substantial settlement amounts.
Second, six years elapsed from the beginning of the first investigation
to the end of the last settlement. 28 The senior managers' cognitive disso-
nance likely had a substantial role in the business practices that led to the
investigations and notable length of those investigations. Once the man-
agers analyzed the business setting of the home health care industry, the
managers would naturally be reluctant to re-analyze it. More precisely,
the Caremark managers may have rejected new evidence suggesting that
their original analysis was wrong or that circumstances warranted a new
approach. Cognitive dissonance might have easily continued during the
investigations and settlements. For example, Caremark made several re-
forms in light of the investigations.2°9 Because of these reforms, the man-
agers might have rejected new developments that criticized the reforms
or proposed further measures. Instead, the managers probably inter-
preted each new development as supporting their initial reaction to the
investigations.
These biases could have persisted long enough to exacerbate greatly
Caremark's problems. As the market leader in home health care, Care-
208. See id. at 960-72.
209. See id. at 962-63.
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mark enjoyed considerable competitive success.21° Caremark, therefore,
presumably enjoyed higher profit margins than its competitors. To the
extent that consumers viewed Caremark's products and services as lack-
ing fungibility, product market forces would be diminished. Capital
markets did not exert constraint on Caremark because Caremark had no
need for new capital. During the investigations, Caremark's stock price
fell precipitously, causing commentators to cite Caremark as a potential
takeover target.2 Nonetheless, during the investigative years, Care-
mark's capital restrictions did not dictate the business or litigation strat-
egy the company adopted."2 Eventually, market forces caught up with
Caremark.213 After the settlements, Caremark chose to end its involve-
ment with home health care and focus on operating physician practice
groups."' To effect this change, Caremark sold its assets rather than tap
the capital markets."5 Presumably, Caremark's depressed price was a
significant constraint in making that decision.
The persistence of Caremark's biases may have resulted from forces
other than blunted market constraints that caused serious corporate
harm. The home health care industry only recently became important to
medical care. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
began to investigate the home health care industry soon after the indus-
try became important to medical care. Because of the novelty of the in-
dustry and unpredictability of DHHS decisions, Caremark did not have a
clear algorithm for responding to these other forces, thus allowing Care-
mark managers' biases to mask optimal choices. Further, Caremark's
business approach was exactly what made it the leading home health care
provider. Bounded rationality worked in Caremark's favor for a consid-
erable time by locking in the successful analysis and approach.
Finally, Caremark's managers' optimism over the possibility of Care-
mark's vindication might have led Caremark to stand firm against the in-
vestigations. These managers may have thought that they would be as
successful in that endeavor as they were in their business approach. In
sum, Caremark's senior managers could easily have had systematic biases
that were deleterious to Caremark's best interest. These biases could
have persisted sufficiently to have caused Caremark exactly the problems
210. See Gene G. Marcial, A Slew Of Suitors Wants To Shower Caremark With TLC,
BUS. WK., Oct. 18,1993, at 90.
211. See id.; see also Stodghill, supra note 176, at 33.
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it suffered.
Although this analysis is conjectural, another telling fact needs empha-
sis. As noted previously, after settling the litigation, Caremark moved
away from home health care to emphasize its other business line, man-
aging and servicing physician practice groups. Caremark's CEO, C.A.
Piccolo, commented on the final settlement, stating that "[t]here are no
drinks or cheers .... I just feel genuinely bad that it happened, and I'm
glad it's over., 216 This statement is less reflective of the past than on fu-
ture events. This attitude is typical among successful as well as unsuc-
cessful businesspersons. This attitude does not support the notion that
managers who believe their actions are ethical and legal will "reform"
themselves easily in reaction to events that suggest change. Therefore,
corporate disclosure to shareholders will not result in managers reform-
ing themselves.
2. Reform of Management
The second principal management reform argument is that increased
disclosure will lead others to reform managers. This is unlikely to hap-
pen in either public or closely held corporations with any great consis-
tency.
In the publicly held company, much of this discussion is moot because
the federal securities laws mandate extensive disclosure. If that fifty-
year-old disclosure system is an accurate indicator of what would happen
if a similar scheme were imposed by state law on closely held companies,
the reform argument falls completely away. In fact, other groups have
not, by and large, reformed management because of required disclosure
obligations.
In the public company, shareholdings are typically dispersed. Thus,
shareholders, as a group, do not exert effective control over the man-
agement of the company, although, two other groups are capable of ex-
erting control over management and, hence, "reforming" the managers.
Institutional shareholders, a subset of the general shareholders, are one
group that is capable of exerting control. Institutional shareholders can
216. Id.
217. On institutional investors and their limitations, see Jayne W. Barnard, Institu-
tional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1135 (1991); Bernard
S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 811 (1992); Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The
Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992); Helen Garten, Institutional Investors
and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 585 (1992); and Mark J. Roe, A Politi-
cal Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991).
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avoid the rational apathy that keeps small shareholders inactive and
therefore gain enough from their activism to make the costs of monitor-
ing and reforming management worthwhile. Further, institutional inves-
tors' inability to liquidate holdings in any particular company makes
them more likely to spend their resources to influence management, al-
though they do not capture all the gains from their efforts.
Even in the public company context, however, strong counterargu-
ments prevail. Institutional investors often remain passive, although
there are incentives to becoming active. The free rider problem and ra-
tional apathy may simply be too much to overcome. Despite the promise
of institutional shareholder activism, many institutional investors also
succumb to the temptation to remain passive to curry management's fa-
vor. In effect, institutional investors are co-opted by a system that gives
institutional investors preferential treatment to consult with manage-
ment, in return for the shareholders' blanket support of the incumbents.
The promise of institutional investor activism has a dark side for other
shareholders as well. The views and incentives of institutional share-
holders may not match a majority of individual shareholders' views. The
interests of the largest and most active institutional shareholders, public
pension funds, are often established by the political nature of trustee ap-
pointments. Institutional investors typically have a short-term focus as
compared to individual investors, which places the optimal corporate
policy for institutional shareholders at odds with that of individual share-
holders.
Additionally, institutional investors do not, by virtue of their size,
beneficiaries, or activism, possess special expertise in advising corporate
management. In fact, many institutional investors contract-out their cor-
porate activism to advisory services, such as the Lens Group. This fur-
ther attenuates the link between corporate governance and the majority
of shareholders. Finally, even if institutional investors capture corporate
management functions, institutional investors will simply reproduce the
disclosure problem at a different level. If institutional investors influence
management, and if the goal of mandatory corporate disclosure is to re-
form those who manage corporations, institutional investors should be
required to disclose information similar to that disclosed by corporate
managers.
If past conduct is any guide to the future, corporate managers in public
companies are less likely to be reformed by shareholders than they are
by another group interested in corporate affairs: financial analysts, and
journalists that typically report about consumer reactions. Financial
analysts and journalists are capable of catalyzing changes in corporate
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attitudes by exposing business practices that are perceived as immoral by
the general public but which management honestly believes is proper.
The very nature of corporate policies often makes it impossible to know
whether a corporation's changed views come in response to pressure
from analysts and journalists. The best interest of the corporation is
served by claiming that the new policy was originally intended or that the
original policy was a rough proposal or trial balloon.
One recent example suggests that analysts and journalists have a
strong affect on corporate policies. In August 1999, Amazon.com, Inc.
announced that it would post on its web site the most popular purchases,
grouped by purchasers in geographic areas, corporations, and universi-
ties."' Almost immediately, newspapers reported that security experts,
customers, and employers of customers objected to these "purchase cir-
cles. ''220  The complainants objected because Amazon.com used data
mining to compile the lists, which they argued was an invasion of privacy
and could allow competitors of the companies profiled to infer strategic
policy. These are, at bottom, ethical concerns. Amazon.com, Inc.
quickly retreated from its original plan and now allows individuals and
companies to opt out of its purchase circles.221
In sum, the group that is most often responsible for bringing about
change in corporate management, journalists and financial analysts,
cannot spur change solely by using information that is disclosed under
the federal mandatory disclosure requirements. Journalists and financial
analysts have other channels and sources of information that are more
germane to the process of corporate cultural change. Thus, in the public
company setting, mandatory disclosure may protect capital markets, but
nonetheless does nothing to enhance corporate governance. In sum, if
the existing mandatory disclosure under federal securities laws is any
guide as to whether non-managers are capable of reforming corporate
management through disclosure requirements, it is unlikely that such re-
form will materialize.
Private corporations would not fare any differently by having imposed
218. Analysts and journalists are the primary agents of exposing corporate behavior
that is flat-out illegal. These groups first exposed, for example, Equity Funding, Home-
stake Oil, ZZZZ Best, and David Begelman.
219. See Amazon's Purchase Circles Guide Shoppers, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 20, 1999,
at Cl.
220. USA Today first broke this story. See Janet Kornblum, Amazon.com Feature Fu-
els Privacy Fears, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 1999, at 1A.
221. See, e.g., George Anders & Lisa Bransten, Amazon to Let Firms Withhold Data
on Habits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1999, at B6; David F. Gallagher, Amazon Moves to Ease
Worry About Privacy of Customers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1999, at C1.
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upon them a more elaborate system of corporate disclosure. If the
shareholdings are widely dispersed, which is an unusual, but not impossi-
ble situation, then reform of management by others seems remote. The
shareholders must unite to forge enough power to reform management;
however, free rider and collective action constraints dampen that possi-
bility. Most privately held companies lack the size to be noticed by fi-
22nancial analysts or other journalists, although there are exceptions.
For the bulk of private corporations, the identity of management and
shareholders means that enhanced corporate disclosure is otiose. Corpo-
rate governors possess all of the information that pertains to corporate
operations because they manage the company. In the vast majority of
privately held corporations, ownership and control are not separated.
Therefore, increased disclosure is unnecessary, except to give more in-
formation to the silent shareholders, if any.
In many private corporations, however, some shareholders have suffi-
cient power to control the corporation, but do not exert their power.
These passive but controlling shareholders, such as venture capitalists or
founding families, cede power to management albeit retaining residual
power. These shareholders need information to exercise their corporate
governance powers intelligently. Like corporate creditors in Hurst's
view, however, these shareholders typically protect their power with con-
223tracts rather than relying upon corporate law schemes.
In public and the private corporations, it is very unlikely that non-
managers can reform management through enhanced state corporate
disclosure laws.
B. Investor and Market Protection Motivations
The potential for better investment decisions by investors and the con-
comitant improvement of secondary securities markets is the second
primary moral argument for increased state corporate disclosure re-
quirements. This is a totally fatuous argument. For public corporations,
such a state disclosure scheme would be duplicative. More theoretically,
many scholars have pointed out that modern portfolio principles strongly
suggest that investors who expend resources in obtaining and analyzing
company-specific information drive up their costs without increasing re-
222. Large privately held companies include Mars, Cargill, and Gallo. Forbes maga-
zine recently reported that 77 of the top 500 privately held companies must make periodic
reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 500 Biggest Private Companies,
FORBES, Dec. 13, 1999, at 167.
223. See PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 130
(1999).
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turns.2 In the macroeconomic analysis, which focuses on society's best
economic interest, rather than that of particular potential investors,
scholars posit that the SEC's mandatory disclosure system is largely out-
dated if it was ever, in fact, dated. Public corporations spend millions
each year complying with mandatory periodic disclosure obligations of
the Securities Exchange Act. Multiple studies have shown that informa-
tion contained in security disclosures is either irrelevant to investors or
impounded in the stock's market price before the disclosures are made.
This is because financial analysts discover, intuit, and calculate much of
the important information before such information is filed with the
SEC. 225
In the non-reporting company setting, increased state corporate disclo-
sure is unlikely to lead to better investment decisions by investors. In-
vestment is typically unmediated; investors deal directly, or nearly so,
with the corporation's principals, perhaps through lawyers or investment
bankers who are charged with finding investors. Investors can use their
contract bargaining power to compel disclosures. Investors that do not
obtain satisfactory disclosure can simply choose not to invest.
An investor who already owns stock in a non-public company will
likewise find increased corporate disclosure unhelpful because of the illi-
quidity of the investment. Although the investor is a shareholder, and is
thus subject to the preceding arguments about whether corporate gov-
ernance is served better by increased disclosure, the question whether to
continue to invest is largely moot. The illiquid nature of close corpora-
tions means that selling is simply not a viable option for most investors.
IV. A MORAL DEFENSE OF STATE CORPORATE LAW DISCLOSURE
The current system of state corporate law disclosure is defensible on
moral grounds. The root of this assertion is that telling the truth is moral
and the current disclosure system is truthful about the relationship be-
tween shareholders and corporate managers. This morality argument ac-
curately reflects the status quo in the corporate world. As discussed pre-
viously, it is simply not true that increased corporate disclosure is
significantly transformative or instrumental. At its most potent, disclo-
sure is incremental in effecting change and is supplemented by other ac-
224. See, e.g., RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE
OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 135-36 (2d ed. 1995).
225. See id. at 136-37; see also Jason Anders & Carrie Lee, Web Site Posts the Earnings
Estimates that Most Sources Will Only Whisper, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1998, at B15 (dis-
cussing the phenomenon of "whisper numbers," which are earnings numbers that corpora-
tions selectively disclose to analysts in advance of a public announcement).
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tions such as notions of social policy and ferreting out of wrongdoing in
spite of, rather than because of, required disclosure to shareholders.
It is more moral to be accurate than disingenuous about the capacity of
corporate disclosure to effect changes in managerial actions. The truth is
that shareholders have ceded, both theoretically and practically, their
money, and control over it, to the board of directors in return for the ex-
pectation of financial gain.
The information required by states reflects this division of power.
Shareholders typically receive annual financial statements. The financial
statements should reflect modern accounting principles to reflect the fi-
nancial condition of the enterprise. There are two examples of such re-
cent changes. First, the statement of cash flows replaced the older state-
ment of changes in financial position in the late 1980s.226 Second,
accountancy is grappling with the appropriate method of disclosing the
value of stock options granted to senior managers."'
Shareholders are typically entitled to disclosure of any significant self-
dealing by senior managers. This is true even when shareholder consent
is not required or resorted to by managers to immunize such a transac-
tion from shareholder attack."' Finally, corporations must disclose in-
formation about proposed fundamental changes to shareholders. This
disclosure reflects the division of power between shareholders and man-
agers because managers cannot complete a fundamental change without
shareholder approval.229
The states' corporate disclosure systems reflect the truth about corpo-
rate decisionmaking power and the possibility of change. Those who
support a different system of disclosure would change the dynamic of
power distribution, which is not desirable. Furthermore, any attempt to
change the dynamic of power distribution via changing the disclosure
regimen will not be effective. Worse, it presumes that the current system
is immoral although the present state of the relationship between share-
holders and managers reflects that this system is highly ethical.
226. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 95: STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS 1 (1987).
227. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 123: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION
(1995).
228. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del.
1998).
229. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242 (amendment of certificate of incorporation),
251 (merger), 271 (sale of assets), 275 (dissolution) (1991); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
8§ 10.03 (amendment of articles of incorporation), 11.02 (merger), 12.02 (sale of all or sub-
stantially all assets), 14.02 (dissolution) (3d ed. & Supp. 1998/99).
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V. CONCLUSION
For over seventy years, the dominant conception of state corporate
disclosure obligations declared that states were recalcitrant, unethical ac-
tors. By enacting the New Deal securities acts, the federal government
rescued the American capital markets by imposing necessary disclosure
requirements. This interpretation is wrong both in its understanding of
the origins of the state regulatory scheme and in the moral implications
of those origins. In truth, the states made completely rational and highly
ethical choices when they decided on the levels of and methods of ap-
propriate corporate disclosure. Therefore, morality-based arguments for
increased state law corporate disclosures do not have a superior claim to
morality. Futhermore, they are unlikely to be effective.
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